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Abstract— According to the traditional probability theory,
events with a positive but very small probability can occur
(although very rarely). For example, from the purely mathematical viewpoint, it is possible that the thermal motion of all
the molecules in a coffee cup goes in the same direction, so this
cup will start lifting up.
In contrast, physicists believe that events with extremely small
probability cannot occur. In this paper, we show that to get
a consistent formalization of this belief, we need, in addition
to the original probability measure, to also consider a maxitive
(possibility) measure.

I. P HYSICISTS ASSUME THAT INITIAL CONDITIONS AND
VALUES OF PARAMETERS ARE NOT ABNORMAL

To a mathematician, the main contents of a physical theory
is its equations. The fact that the theory is formulated in terms
of well-defined mathematical equations means that the actual
field must satisfy these equations. However, this fact does not
mean that every solution of these equations has a physical
sense. Let us give three examples:
Example 1. At any temperature greater than absolute zero,
particles are randomly moving. It is theoretically possible that
all the particles start moving in one direction, and, as a result,
a person starts lifting up into the air. The probability of this
event is small (but positive), so, from the purely mathematical
viewpoint, we can say that this event is possible but highly
unprobable. However, the physicists say plainly that such an
abnormal event is impossible (see, e.g., [6]).
Example 2. Another example from statistical physics: Suppose
that we have a two-chamber camera. The left chamber is
empty, the right one has gas in it. If we open the door between
the chambers, then the gas would spread evenly between the
two chambers. It is theoretically possible (under appropriately
chosen initial conditions) that the gas that was initially evenly
distributed would concentrate in one camera. However, physicists believe this abnormal event to be impossible. This is an
example of a “micro-reversible” process: on the atomic level,
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all equations are invariant with respect to changing the order
of time flow (t → −t). So, if we have a process that goes
from state A to state B, then, if while at B, we revert all the
velocities of all the atoms, we will get a process that goes
from B to A.
However, in real life, many processes are clearly irreversible: an explosion can shatter a statue but it is hard to
imagine an inverse process: an implosion that glues together
shattered pieces into a statue. Boltzmann himself, the 19th
century author of statistical physics, explicitly stated that such
inverse processes “may be regarded as impossible, even though
from the viewpoint of probability theory that outcome is only
extremely improbable, not impossible.” [1].
Example 3. If we toss a fair coin 100 times in a row, and
get heads all the time, then a person who is knowledgeable in
probability would say that it is possible – since the probability
is still positive. On the other hand, a physicist (or any person
who uses common sense reasoning) would say that the coin is
not fair – because if it is was a fair coin, then this abnormal
event would be impossible.
In all these cases, physicists (implicitly or explicitly) require
that the actual values of the physical quantities must not only
satisfy the equations but they must also satisfy the additional
condition: that the initial conditions should not be abnormal.
Comment. In all these examples, a usual mathematician’s
response to physicists’ calling some low-probability events
“impossible”, is just to say that the physicists use imprecise
language.
It is indeed true that the physicists use imprecise language,
and it is also true that in the vast majority of practical applications, a usual probabilistic interpretation of this language
perfectly well describes the intended physicists’ meaning. In
other words, the probability language is perfectly OK for most
physical applications.

However, there are some situations when the physicists’
intuition seem to differ from the results of applying traditional
probability techniques:
• From the probability theory viewpoint, there is no fundamental difference between such low-probability events
as a person winning a lottery and the same person being
lifted up into the air by the Brownian motion. If a person
plays the lottery again and again, then – provided that this
person lives for millions of years – he will eventually win.
Similarly, if a person stands still every morning, then –
provided that this person lives long enough – this person
will fly up into the air.
• On the other hand, from the physicist viewpoint, there
is a drastic difference between these two low-probability
events: yes, a person will win a lottery but no, a person
will never lift up into the air no matter how many times
this person stands still.
We have just mentioned that the traditional mathematical
approach is to treat this difference of opinion as simply caused
by the imprecision of the physicists’ language. What we plan
to show is that if we take this difference more seriously and
develop a new formalism that more accurately captures the
physicists’ reasoning, then we may end up with results and
directions that are, in our opinion, of potential interest to
foundations of physics.
In other words, what we plan to show is that if we continue
to use the traditional probability approach, it is perfectly OK
but if we try to formalize the physicists’ opinion more closely,
we may sometimes get even better results.
Comment. It is known that the probabilistic approach is, in
principle, quite capable of describing uncertainty in physical
systems; in particular, the probabilistic approach is capable
of describing rare events in physical systems. Some problems
related to rare events require new probabilistic techniques, but
overall, within a traditional probabilistic approach, there seems
to be no need to introduce possibility measures.
It is also known that possibility measures can be useful for
physical applications, e.g., to reflect considerable vagueness
in the dynamical laws of complex physical systems, to describe the vague, fuzzy character of the experts (= physicists)
knowledge about these systems.
What we plan to show, in this paper, is that there is
one more area where possibility measures can be helpful in
physical applications: in describing the physicists’ intuition
about rare events, an intuition that is somewhat different from
its traditional probabilistic description.
II. A SEEMINGLY NATURAL FORMALIZATIONS OF THIS
IDEA

The above-mentioned property of being “not abnormal”
(“typical”) has a natural formalization: if a probability p(E)
of an event E is small enough, i.e., if p(E) ≤ p0 for some
very small threshold p0 , then this event cannot happen.
In other words, there exists the “smallest possible probability” p0 such that:

if the computed probability p of some event is larger than
p0 , then this event can occur, while
• if the computed probability p is ≤ p0 , the event cannot
occur.
For example, the probability that a fair coin falls heads 100
times in a row is 2−100 , so, if the threshold probability p0
satisfies the inequality p0 ≥ 2−100 , then we will be able to
conclude that such an event is impossible.
•

III. T HE ABOVE FORMALIZATION OF THE NOTION OF
“ TYPICAL” IS NOT ALWAYS ADEQUATE
In the previous section, we described a seemingly natural
formalization of the notion “typical” (“not abnormal”): if a
probability of an event is small enough, i.e., ≤ p0 for some
very small p0 , then this event cannot happen.
The problem with this approach is that every sequence
of heads and tails has exactly the same probability. So, if
we choose p0 ≥ 2−100 , we will thus exclude all possible
sequences of 100 heads and tails as physically impossible.
However, anyone can toss a coin 100 times, and this proves
that some such sequences are physically possible.
Historical comment. This problem was first noticed by Kyburg
under the name of Lottery paradox [9]: in a big (e.g., statewide) lottery, the probability of winning the Grand Prize is so
small that a reasonable person should not expect it. However,
some people do win big prizes.
IV. R ELATION TO NON - MONOTONIC REASONING
Lottery paradox has been known for several decades, and
many solutions have been proposed to resolve this paradox.
One possible solutions comes from the fact that in deriving
the above paradox, we used classical logic, a logic that is
monotonic in the following sense: once we made a logical
conclusion, this conclusion remains valid no matter what new
knowledge we acquire. In classical logic, if we increase the
set of facts and rules, the set of conclusions can only increase.
Our objective, however, is to formalize expert reasoning
(specifically, physicists’ reasoning), and it is known that the
expert reasoning is, in general, not monotonic. For example,
if we know that birds normally fly, and we see a bird, then we
normally conclude that this bird can fly. However, if it later
turns out that this bird is an abnormal bird, e.g., a penguin,
that we take back our original conclusion and conclude that
this particular bird does not fly.
It is known that if we take the non-monotonic character of
expert reasoning into consideration, then the lottery paradox
stops being a paradox, it becomes simply one of the nonmonotonic features of expert reasoning; see, e.g., Poole [11],
[12] (see also [7]). Specifically, if we use formalisms like
default logic that have been designed to capture commonsense
reasoning, we can explain the above paradox.
From the pragmatic viewpoint, this approach is very satisfactory; however, from the foundational viewpoint, the existing
description of commonsense non-monotonic reasoning is still
being developed, better and better semantics of non-monotonic

reasoning – in particular, reasoning about what is typical and
what is normal – are appearing all the time.
What we plan to do in this paper is restrict ourselves only to
the description of rare events. For this narrow specialized area
of reasoning, we will provide a formalization of the notions
of “typical” and “normal”, and thus, in effect, we provide a
specific non-monotonic logic – a logic is reasonably final (and
thus, does not depend on the fact that the general description
of non-monotonic reasoning is still far from being final).
Comment. It is worth mentioning that there is an interesting
alternative approach to the above solution of the lottery paradox: namely, we can, alternatively, conclude that our intuition
is simply wrong and that events with very small (even 0)
probability can actually happen.
This alternative approach was pioneered by such wellknown specialists in philosophical foundations of probability
theory as K. Popper and B. de Finetti (see, e.g., [3]). This approach is currently being successfully developed by G. Coletti,
A. Gilio, R. Scozzafava, W. Spohn, and others (see, e.g., [2]
and references therein). Within this alternative approach, there
is a natural hierarchy of zero probability events (induced by
the corresponding conditional probabilities), and this hierarchy
also leads to a maxitive measure!
Since our objective is to formalize the physicists’ intuition,
not to reject it, we do not follow this alternative approach.
However, the very fact that both approaches lead to the same
formalism of maxitive measures makes us think that maybe
there is a deep relation and similarity between these two
approaches.
V. KOLMOGOROV ’ S IDEA : USE COMPLEXITY
Crudely speaking, the main problem arises because we
select the same threshold p0 for all events. For example, if
we toss a fair coin 100 times then a sequence consisting of all
heads should not be possible, and it is a reasonable conclusion
because the probability that tossing a fair coin will lead to this
sequence is extremely small: 2−100 .
On the other hand, whatever specific sequence of heads and
tails we get after tossing a coin, this sequence also has the
same small probability 2−100 . In spite of this, it does not seem
to be reasonable to dismiss such sequences.
Several researchers thought about this, one of them A.
N. Kolmogorov, the father of the modern probability theory.
Kolmogorov came up with the following idea: the probability
threshold t(E) below which an event E is dismissed as
impossible must depend on the event’s complexity. The event
E1 in which we have 100 heads is easy to describe and
generate; so for this event, the threshold t(E1 ) is higher. If
t(E1 ) > 2−100 then, within this Kolmogorov’s approach, we
conclude that the event E1 is impossible. On the other hand,
the event E2 corresponding to the actual sequence of heads
and tails is much more complicated; for this event E2 , the
threshold t(E2 ) should be much lower. If t(E2 ) < 2−100 , we
conclude that the event E2 is possible.
The general fact that out of 2n equally probable sequences
of n 0s and 1s some are “truly random” and some are not truly

random was the motivation behind Kolmogorov and MartinLöf’s formalization of randomness (and behind the related
notion of Kolmogorov complexity; the history of this discovery
is described in detail in [10]).
This notion of Kolmogorov complexity was introduced
independently by several people: Kolmogorov in Russia and
Solomonoff and Chaitin in the US. Kolmogorov defined complexity K(x) of a binary sequence x as the shortest length
of a program which produces this sequence. Thus, a sequence
consisting of all 0s or a sequence 010101. . . both have very
small Kolmogorov complexity because these sequences can
be generated by simple programs; on the other hand, for a
sequence of results of tossing a coin, probably the shortest
program is to write print(0101. . . ) and thus reproduce the
entire sequence. Thus, when K(x) is approximately equal to
the length len(x) of a sequence, this sequence is random, otherwise it is not. (The best source for Kolmogorov complexity
is a book [10].)
However, the existing Kolmogorov complexity theory does
not yet lead to a formalism describing when low-probability
events do not happen; we must therefore extend the original
Kolmogorov’s idea so that it would cover this case as well.
VI. F ORMALIZATION AND THE M AIN R ESULT
Let us start with motivations. We have mentioned that
we cannot consistently claim that an event E is possible if
and only its probability p(E) exceeds a certain threshold p0 ;
instead, we must take into consideration that “complexity”
c(E) of an event, and claim, e.g., that an event E is possible
if and only if p(E) > p0 · c(E), i.e., equivalently, m(E) > p0 ,
def
where we denoted m(E) = p(E)/c(E).
Comment. To handle events with 0 probability, we must extend
the ratio m(E) to such events – otherwise, e.g., for the uniform
distribution on the interval [0, 1], we would have p({x}) =
0 ≤ p0 · c({x}) hence no point x would be possible.
We would like to characterize the “ratio measures” m(E)
for which this definition is, in some reasonable sense, “consistent” for all possible thresholds p0 . In order to do that, let
us first find out how to formalize the notion of “consistency”.
Let X be the set of all possible outcomes. An event is then
simply a subset E of the set X, and p is a probability measure
on a σ-algebra of sets from X.
Let T ⊆ X be the set of all outcomes that are actually
possible. Then, an event E is possible if and only if there is
a possible outcome that belongs to the set E, i.e., if and only
if E ∩ T 6= ∅.
Now, we are ready for the main definition:
Definition 1. Let X be a set, and let A ⊆ 2X be a σ-algebra
of subsets of the set X. By a ratio measure m we mean a
mapping from A to the set of non-negative real numbers (and,
possibly a value +∞) such that for every real number p0 > 0,
there exists a set T (p0 ) for which
∀E ∈ A (m(E) > p0 ↔ E ∩ T (p0 ) 6= ∅).

(1)

•

m(E) < sup m(Eα ).
α

To describe our main result, we need to recall the definition
of a maxitive (possibility) measure [5], [13], [14]:
Definition 2. A mapping m from sets to real numbers (and possibly a value +∞) is called a maxitive (possibility) measure
if for every family of sets Eα for which m(Eα ) and m(∪Eα )
are defined, we have
Ã
!
[
m
Eα = sup m(Eα ).
α

α

Comment. Our definition is slightly more general than the
definitions from [5], [13], [14]:
• in [5], [14], only values m(E) ∈ [0, 1] are allowed, while
we allow arbitrary non-negative values;
• in [13], the maxitive property is only required for finite
families Eα , while we allow arbitrary (in particular,
infinite) families of sets.
Theorem 1. For a given probability measure p(E), a function
m(E) is a ratio measure if and only if it is a maxitive
(possibility) measure.
Comment about the result. Since m(E) = p(E)/c(E) is a
possibility measure, we thus have c(E) = m(E)/p(E). In
other words,
possibility
complexity =
.
probability
Comment about the result and about the following proof. This
result is in perfect accordance with a recent paper by D.
Dubois, H. Fargier, and H. Prade [4] in which the authors
prove that the only uncertainty theory coherent with the notion
of accepted belief is possibility theory.
Moreover, even our proof is similar to the proofs from [4],
[5]. In principle, we could drastically shorten our proof if,
instead of presenting our proof step by step, we would instead
simply explain what needs to change in these proofs. This
would be sufficient for specialists in possibility theory.
However, one of our main objectives is to win more converts
for the possibility theory. For the benefit of these potential
converts who are not yet familiar with the possibility theory
and its proofs, we decided to present the proof “from scratch”.
Proof. Let us first prove that every ratio measure m(E)
is indeed a maxitive measure. By definition of a maxitive
measure, we need to prove that if Eα is a family of sets from
the σ-algebra A for which the union E = ∪Eα also belongs
to A, we have m(E) = sup m(Eα ).
α

Let us prove this inequality by reduction to a contradiction.
Let us assume that m(E) 6= sup m(Eα ). In this case, we have
α

two options:
• m(E) > sup m(Eα ) and
α

Let us show that in both cases, we have a contradiction.
Indeed, by definition of a ratio measure, for every p0 , there
exists a set T (p0 ) such that for every set S, we have m(S) >
p0 if and only if S ∩ T (p0 ) > 0.
If m(E) < sup m(Eα ), let us select p0 for which
α

m(E) < p0 < sup m(Eα ).
α

Since m(E) < p0 , we conclude that the event E is not
possible, i.e.,
E ∩ T (p0 ) = ∅.
(2)
On other hand, since p0 < sup m(Eα ), there exists a value α0
α

for which p0 < m(Eα0 ). For this α0 , by definition of a ratio
measure, the event Eα0 is possible, so there exists an outcome
x from Eα0 that also belongs to the set T (p0 ) of possible
events. However, since E = ∪Eα , we have x ∈ E, so x ∈ E ∩
T (p0 ) – which contradicts our previous conclusion (2). This
contradiction shows that the inequality m(E) < sup m(Eα )
α

is impossible.
If m(E) > sup m(Eα ), let us select p0 for which
α

m(E) > p0 > sup m(Eα ).
α

Since m(E) > p0 , we conclude that the event E is possible,
i.e., there exist an outcome x that belongs both to E and to
T (p0 ). Since E is the union of the set Eα , this event x belongs
to one of the sets Eα0 . Thus, Eα0 ∩T (p0 ) 6= ∅, so by definition
of a complexity measure, we should have
m(Eα0 ) > p0

(3)

for this α0 . However, from our assumption m(E) >
sup m(Eα ) and from the fact that sup m(Eα ) ≥ m(Eα0 ),
α

α

we conclude that m(Eα0 ) < p0 – a contradiction with our
previous conclusion (3). This contradiction shows that the
inequality m(E) > sup m(Eα ) is also impossible.
α

Thus, every ratio measure m(E) is indeed a maxitive
measure.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we must now prove
that if m(E) is a maxitive measure, then it is a ratio measure.
To prove this, we will show that for every positive real number
p0 , there exists a set T (p0 ) that satisfies the condition (1). We
will show that as such a set, we can take a complement to the
union of all sets S ∈ A for which m(S) ≤ p0 , i.e.,
T (p0 ) = − ∪ {S ∈ A | m(S) ≤ p0 }.

(4)

We must prove that for every E ∈ A, E ∩ T (p0 ) 6= ∅ if and
only if m(E) > p0 . Actually, we will prove an equivalent
statement: that for every E ∈ A, E ∩ T (p0 ) = ∅ if and only
if m(E) ≤ p0 .
If m(E) ≤ p0 , then E is completely contained in the union
∪{S ∈ A | m(S) ≤ p0 }, thus, E cannot have common points
with the complement T (p0 ) to this union.

Vice versa, let us assume that for some event E ∈ A, we
have E ∩ T (p0 ) = ∅. This means that the set E is completely
contained in the complement to T (p0 ), i.e., that
E ⊆ ∪{S ∈ A | m(S) ≤ p0 }.
Thus,
E = ∪{S ∩ E | S ∈ A & m(S) ≤ p0 }.

(5)

If the set S and E belongs to a σ-algebra, then their intersection and their difference also belong to the σ-algebra. From
S = (S∩E)∪(S−E) and the definition of a maxitive measure,
we thus conclude that m(S) = max(m(S ∩ E), m(S − E))
hence m(S ∩ E) ≤ m(S). So, if m(S) ≤ p0 , we have
m(S ∩ E) ≤ m(S) ≤ p0 hence m(S ∩ E) ≤ p0 .
Applying the definition of a maxitive measure to the formula
(5), we can now conclude that m(E) = sup m(S ∩ E), where
supremum is taken over all S ∈ A for which m(S) ≤ p0 . We
have already shown that for all such S, we have m(S ∩ E) ≤
p0 . Thus, m(E) is the supremum of a set of numbers each of
which is ≤ p0 . We can therefore conclude that m(E) ≤ p0 .
The theorem is proven.

Proof. To prove this theorem, we will assume that a universal
complexity measure c(E) exists, and from this assumption,
we will deduce a contradiction.
First, let us show that if A ⊂ B are two sets from the σalgebra A for which B 6= X, then c(A) ≥ c(B). Indeed, let
us prove that if c(A) < c(B), then we get a contradiction.
If c(A) < c(B), then we can set up a probability measure p
for which p(A) = c(B) > 0 and p(B − A) = 0. For this
probability measure, p(B) = p(A) + p(B − A) = c(B),
hence p(B) ≤ c(B) and p(B) > 0. By definition of a
universal complexity measure, this means that the set B has
no common points with T [p]. Since A is a subset of B, it
also has no common points with T [p]; due to p(A) > 0, we
should have p(A) ≤ c(A). However, p(A) = c(B) > c(A) – a
contradiction shows that the case c(A) < c(B) is impossible.
Let us now show if A ⊂ B and c(B) > 0, then c(A) =
c(B). We already know that c(A) ≥ c(B). Thus, it is sufficient
to show that if c(A) > c(B), then we get a contradiction.
Indeed, since c(B) > 0 and B − A ⊆ B, we have

VII. AUXILIARY RESULT

c(B − A) ≥ c(B) > 0.

Our definition of complexity depends on the choice of the
probability measure. In other words, complexity of an event
depends on the problem that we are trying to solve. This makes
sense because what we are looking for is complexity relevant
to the problem.
However, a natural question is: is it possible to have a
“universal” complexity measure, i.e., a complexity measure
that will serve all possible probability measures p(E)? The
answer is “no”, even if, instead of all possible thresholds p0 ,
we just consider a single one. This result is true even for X
equal to the standard interval [0, 1].
Let us describe this result in precise terms.

Let c(A) > c(B), then we can set up a probability measure p
for which p(A) = c(A) and

Definition 3. Let X = [0, 1], and let A ⊆ 2X be a σ-algebra
of all Lebesgue-measurable sets. By a universal complexity
measure c we mean a mapping from A to the interval [0, 1]
for which 0 < c([a, b]) < 1 for every interval [a, b], and for
every probability measure p on A, there exists a set T [p] for
which
∀E ∈ A (p(E) > 0 → (p(E) > c(E) ↔ E ∩ T [p] 6= ∅)).

Theorem 2. A universal complexity measure is impossible.
Comment 1. Since we gave a rationale that m(E) has the form
p(E)/c(E), and another rationale for having m(E) maxitive,
the impossibility result is not unexpected.
Comment 2. The term “complexity” has many meanings; in
this paper, we only use it as a way to describe which rare
events are possible and which are not. From this viewpoint,
Theorem 2 is not so much a theorem complex complexity
but rather a result about the impossibility of representing
physicists’ reasoning about rare events in purely probabilistic
terms – a result similar, in spirit, to results from [4].

0 < p(B − A) ≤ c(B − A).
For this probability measure, p(A) ≤ c(A) and p(A) > 0,
hence the set A cannot have any common points with T [p].
Similarly, since 0 < p(B − A) ≤ c(B − A), the set B −
A cannot have any common points with T [p]. Since neither
the set A nor the set B − A can have common points with
T [p], their union B = A ∪ (B − A) also cannot have any
common points with T [p]. According to the definition of a
universal complexity measure and the fact that p(B) > 0, this
would mean that p(B) ≤ c(B), but p(B) > c(A) > c(B).
The contradiction shows that the case c(A) > c(B) is also
impossible.
So, A ⊆ B and c(B) > 0 imply that c(A) = c(B).
Let [a, b] be an arbitrary interval 6= [0, 1]. Then, by definition, c([a, b]) > 0, so, for every set E ⊆ [a, b], we have
c(E) = c([a, b]). Let us select an integer n > 1/c([a, b])
and divide the interval [a, b] into n subintervals of equal
size. For the uniform distribution on the interval [a, b], the
probability p(E) of each subinterval E is equal to 1/n. Since
n > 1/c([a, b]), we thus conclude that p(E) = 1/n ≤
c([a, b]), i.e., p(E) < c(E) = c([a, b]). Thus, none of these
n subintervals can contain elements from T [p]. On the other
hand, p([a, b]) = 1 > c([a, b]) hence the union [a, b] of these n
subintervals does contain elements from T [p] – a contradiction.
The theorem is proven.
VIII. C ONCLUSION
According to the traditional probability theory, events with
a positive but very small probability can occur (although very
rarely). For example, from the purely mathematical viewpoint,

it is possible that the thermal motion of all the molecules in
a coffee cup goes in the same direction, so this cup will start
lifting up.
In contrast, physicists believe that events with extremely
small probability cannot occur. In this paper, we show that
to get a consistent formalization of this belief, we need, in
addition to the original probability measure, to also consider
a maxitive (possibility) measure.
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